INFANTRY LETTERS



MORE ON EIB ROAD MARCH STANDARD

Reference Captain Martin N. Stanton's letter on the EIB road march standard (INFANTRY, July-August 1988, pages 5-6), many people over the years have questioned various aspects of the criteria for awarding the EIB. Like tall trees in a windstorm, the criteria have swayed back and forth many times, but thus far have always settled down in a relatively strong position.

The purpose of the EIB road march is to add one more important criterion to a long list of criteria that collectively say "This soldier is not just an 11B, but an expert 11B." I think that is an important distinction. The badge testifies that the wearer was willing to dedicate extra effort to master the tasks, to endure the pain, to face challenge with confidence, to risk failure, and to participate in keeping a proud tradition alive and consistent. I believe that a soldier so inclined can be depended upon to do any other difficult and extra task he is asked to do.

Captain Stanton, like many others before him, has proposed some test of *will* other than the 12-mile road march. What he hasn't done is to show why his proposal is any better than the current test of *will*. I can see no relationship between military operations and 12 miles in a PT uniform. He would have to prove that 25 miles in 9 hours is better than the EIB standard, or better than 50 miles in 20 hours, or an infinite number of other combinations. Then he would have to define "full combat load."

I am not against change, only against change just for the sake of change. I would not want to change the requirements for the EIB except after careful consideration, because, among other things, the EIB should represent a baseline against which to compare soldiers. I want the badge I wear with *pride*, *concern*, and *professionalism* to be equal to, but not better than, the ones that were earned last year and the ones that will be earned next year.

If I were to propose a change, it would be to authorize the addition of some currency device to the badge so that one could tell *when* the wearer had been declared an *expert infantryman*—maybe something that showed annual reaffirmation.

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STANDARDIZED UNITS

I commend you for publishing yet another new article on exactly how units should best be organized for training in and conducting the art of warfare ("Standardizing Our Units," by Major General Kenneth C. Leuer, September-October 1988, pages 1-2). I have been through only three major TOE changes in my brief 18 years in the infantry, but these changes significantly disrupted the units with which I was associated.

This proposal, however, is simply another of the many subjective opinions on what is the *best* system. I have always felt that I could "fight and win" with any of the TOEs over the years. Which one was *best* is a relative and subjective opinion that will beget as much discussion as the TOE composition itself.

I laud the conclusion that the foot soldier will never be obsolete. Someone has to occupy and manage the final piece of ground (the part with human involvement), and only the soldier, not the equipment, can do that. Occasionally, technology (such as gunpowder, radios, or airplanes, not different *types* of them), will dictate modification. Whether we should have 3-5 platoons, 7-13 people in the squad, or 3-6 companies in a battalion will never be finally resolved.

My real question is: If we decided that now is the time to pick the "final" TOE (or at least one that might endure for one infantryman's career), could you accept the fact that your solution was not picked?

The proposed rifle company looks good to me. In fact, it looked good in 1971. The only differences are that the old me said "special weapons" (106mm recoilless rifle and later, TOW) instead of "Dragon teams," and the machineguns went from the rifle squads to the platoon headquarters to the weapons platoon with every changing commander.

Why not change "Dragon teams" to something else? (Dragons won't last forever.) Why not assign the machineguns by individual soldier (paragraph and line number in the TOE) and let the platoon leader and the company commander do what they are getting paid for?

As the article says, "For combat, leaders must task organize on the basis of METT-T. Nonetheless, as a point of departure, we should want all units to have the same basic organization."

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M249 MACHINEGUN (SAW)

The adoption of the M249 SAW has corrected the outstanding equipment deficiency of the United States Infantry. But the decision to replace automatic rifles with it on a one-for-one basis shows that the related organizational and tactical defects are still with us.

The most effective infantry squads or sections, at least since von Hutier's offensive at Riga in September 1917, have been organized as a light machinegun team and a maneuver element. And the

tactics of these groups have been based on getting the machinegun into the best possible position from which to support the offense and provide the basis for the defense.

A weapon such as the M249 with a quick-change barrel and a large-capacity feed system—if it is adequately supplied with spare barrels and ammunition—has at least eight times the sustained firepower of a normal rifle.

A good start for a nine-man squad would be a four-man machinegun team with at least two spare barrels, a four-man team with rifles and grenade launchers only, and the squad leader. Tactics should then be developed that would allow the most effective use of the machinegun.

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CAMBs—LET'S LOOK BEFORE WE LEAP

For several years, I have watched with alarm the Army's unthinking drift toward the CAMB (combined arms maneuver battalion) organization. (See "CAMBs: A Better Solution," by Captain Matthew Moten, INFANTRY, September-October 1988, pages 13-15.) It seems that the further we get away from wartime experiences between large armored forces, the more appealing ideas such as the CAMB seem to get. This trend is understandable, since most training today is at the task force level. Thus, we tend to think by implication that in a future armored conflict the task force will be the keystone organization, and that, therefore, anything that increases the effectiveness of the task force must, in itself, be good.

Part of the blame for this thinking lies with NTC training, which currently is at task force level. The lessons we learn there must be viewed with caution, however, since many components are absent that would be present in combat between large forces.

Principally missing are the effects that actions by higher echelons have on the task force battle. Among these are the effect of the covering force battle in the main battle area, the effects of corps and division deep battle actions, the easing of the task force commander's burden by functional chains of command (ADA, Engineer, Artillery, for example), and most important, the effect on the task force of task organization by the corps, division, and brigade.

Task organization is a technique that has been proved by time and by warfare. The premise behind the concept lies in the principle of economy of force. We task organize at every level in order to apply limited resources in the most effective manner. This allocation of resources is based on a detailed estimate of the situation and on the selection of a course of action. Higher echelons provide the resources the units need to accomplish the assigned tasks under an acceptable degree



of risk. Since the ratio of armor to mechanized infantry is fixed in the CAMB, there is no question that the concept limits a brigade commander's flexibility in task organizing his battalions to meet the specific needs of the situation.

Advocates of the concept acknowledge that this is a disadvantage, but one they are willing to bear for the benefits that accrue from the organic association between armor and mechanized infantry units at the task force level. As evidence of the wisdom of such a tradeoff, NTC performance is often cited. Yet, the NTC provides an experience that does not adequately represent the contributions of multiple echelons of command on the direct fire battle. I am fairly confident that five years from today, when the NTC is fully exercising brigades, the argument will shift to the need for self-sufficient brigade task forces with *organic* artillery, engineers, ADA, and so on. The brigade will then become the central tactical organization in the minds of commanders, just as the task force is central today. And if we were to run large scale division level exercises some day, a different focus would once again emerge.

Military organizations grow and evolve as a result of many factors. Among them are changes in doctrine, technology, or the threat, and feedback from actual war, training exercises, or wargaming. The NTC offers us valuable, training-based feedback on our procedures, tactics, and organizations. But this feedback must be examined rationally to determine which lessons are applicable to a full-scale war between mechanized forces and which lessons are the result of the limited NTC environment. I fear that the drift toward the CAMB is the result of an NTC-peculiar situation.

There are many good reasons for the current battalion organization along branch lines. Most of these reasons have to do either with efficiency in training or with the level at which combined arms are most effectively and efficiently integrated. Today, the responsibility for combined arms integration rests at brigade level. Here, armor battalions, infantry battalions, and combat direct support assets are task organized to accomplish specific missions. We have selected the brigade as the level for combined arms integration on the basis of a wealth of historical, modeling, and training experience. We should be very careful in discarding this experience for the short-term benefit of winning at the NTC.

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MAJ
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CANADIANS IN VIETNAM

As Military Historian of the Canadian War Museum, I am trying to contact Canadians who served in the armed forces of the United States in Vietnam.

If any veterans of that war can be of assistance, please write to me at the Canadian War Museum, 330 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Canada, K1A OM8; telephone (613) 996-1388.

FRED GAFFEN

GUMMY BEAR LEADERSHIP

As Inspector General of the 2d Infantry Division in the Republic of Korea, I always took time during inspections to conduct seminars with soldiers, NCOs, and particularly junior officers. This gave me an opportunity to share some of my own experiences with young officers just beginning their careers. One of these experiences I called "Gummy Bear Leadership," on how to motivate and reward soldiers.

Earlier, after I had finished the advanced course in 1973, I was sent to Indiana University to get a master's degree in physical education. One course was taught by Dr. Councilman, the swimming coach, possibly the best swimming coach in the Big 10 Conference. (He had coached such notables as Mark Spitz, who won seven gold medals in the 1972 olympics.) Doc's PhD was not in PE but in psychology, and the class was one on the high level performance of athletes.

One day I commented to Doc that it must be satisfying to take young swimmers from high school and teach them to be great swimmers. He said he did not do that; he recruited great swimmers and there was very little he could actually teach them. His reply surprised me, and I asked how he managed to have one of the consistently best swim teams in the nation. Through motivation, he said. Later I learned Doc's secret of Gummy Bear Leadership and the three principles of motivation involved.

Doc would buy Gummy Bears (the tiny German candies made in the shape of teddy bears) by the case, and always carried a bag of them during swimming practice. Any time a swimmer performed well in practice he would immediately be rewarded with a Gummy Bear. More often than not, Doc would challenge a swimmer; for example, if the swimmer could do the next lap one-tenth of a second faster, Doc would give him a Gummy Bear, immediately, in front of his peers so that everyone would take notice. At the end of the practice, Doc would reward everyone by throwing the Bears into the pool. The scene was similar to a shark feeding frenzy.

It may seem too simple, but it worked. The swimmers would swear that Doc's Gummy Bears tasted better than those they could buy in a store.

Doc's Gummy Bear Leadership worked on three principles, which are as true in the Army as they were in college swimming:

- The reward was immediate—not after practice, the next day, or the next week.
- The reward was presented in front of peers.
- The reward was presented by the coach, never delegated to the assistant coach, the manager, or the deputy.

Everyone likes to be a winner at some time or another, and successful leaders look for opportunities to make their subordinates winners—even if they have to create the situation. The more often the feeling of being a winner is reinforced, the more people want to win.

Does this type of leadership work in the Army? A platoon leader has only to try it to prove it. One platoon leader in the ADA battalion of the 2d Division did just that. Since Gummy Bears were not readily available in Korea, he used Tootsie Rolls. Every time he saw a soldier doing something well, he gave him a Tootsie Roll sucker. Soon, whenever one of his soldiers did something outstanding when he was not there, the soldier went and found him to report his performance and get a Tootsie Roll. This lieutenant ended with an exceptional platoon.

It seems simple, and it is. It also seems too childish to work with soldiers, but it does. And if it works, who cares if it looks childish or too simple to outsiders?

The only thing that is important is this: a soldier knows that his leader knows he did a good job and rewarded that performance immediately in front of his peers.

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TENTH MOUNTAIN DIVISION

Some 3,800 veterans are members of the National Association of the Tenth Mountain Division. In a unique, cooperative effort to preserve the history of this important unit, the Denver Public Library and the Colorado Historical Society have announced the creation of the Tenth Mountain Division Resource Center (TMDRC).

The center, managed jointly by both institutions, will collect and maintain archival material and artifacts contributed by veterans of the Division.

The Library's Western History Department will supervise a special collection of documentary and archival materials, such as letters, induction papers, personal notes, manuscripts, film and video materials, photos, and scrapbooks. The Colorado Historical Society will be responsible for three-dimensional items such as clothing, equipment, weapons, packs, insignia, and metals, and original artwork.

The TMDRC will provide access through a nationwide computer database, preserve materials by the most modern methods, and be able to respond to queries for information.

This arrangement does not obligate Association members to donate their items to the Denver institutions. But materials have already been received from many members, including the collection of the first president and chairman of the Association, Earl E. Clark.

For information on the TMDRC, or to contribute materials, contact Barbara Walton, Denver Public Library, 1357 Broadway, Denver, CO 80203, (303) 571-2015; or Georgianna Contiguglia, Colorado Historical Society, 1300 Broadway, Denver, CO 80203, (303) 866-4697.

BONNIE McCUNE
Denver Public Library

SMOKE/OBSCURANTS SYMPOSIUM

Smoke/Obscurants Symposium XIII will be conducted 25-27 April 1989 at John Hopkins University, Laurel, Maryland.

Further information is available from Science and Technology Corporation, P.O. Box 7390, Hampton VA 23666-0321.

CAROLYN A. KEEN
Symposium Coordinator